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UPWARDS? TESTS OF THE GENERAL
HUMAN crra MODEL
ABSTRACT
This paper tests some empirical implications of the general human capital model's
explanation of rising wage profiles. At the individual level, the model implies that there will be
a negative relationship between the initial wage level and wage growth of young, inexperienced
workers. At the market level, the model implies that the present value of the wage profile of an
investor equals that of an otherwise identical non-investor, or that the ratio of the present values
equals one. We test both of these hypotheses.
Evidence on the wage level-wage growth tradeoff points to a negative relationship
between initial wage levels and wage growth, even after correcting for negative biases that may
have influenced existing estimates of this relationship. Evidence on present values of wage
profiles suggests that the ratio of the present value of rising wage profiles to flat wage profiles
is quite close to one. Alternative estimates of this ratio are tightly clustered around one, and
more often than not are insignificantly different from one. Overall, then, the evidence is largely
consistent with the general human capital model.
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Department of Economics Department of Economics
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and NBER andNBERI. Introduction
One of the most robust findings in labor economics is a positive return to time in the
labormarket in standard log wage equations, throughout much of the working life, But
economists disagree on the source of this relationship. The dominant explanation is probably
the general human capital model, in which the stock of human capital rises with experience
as people invest in general human capital (not limited to a specific finn). resulting initially in
lower real wages and subsequently in higher real wages (Ben-Porath, 1967; Mincer, 1974;
Becker, 1975). A second explanation that has attracted considerable interest is that long-term
incentive-compatible contracts must pay workers less than their marginal product when
young, and more when old; thus, even if productivity is constant over a worker's life, wages
will rise (Lazear, 1979 and 1981)•t
Muchexisting research testing the competing models considers whether wage increases
are closely positively correlated with productivity increases (e.g., Medoff and Abraham, 1981;
Brown. 1989; Kotlikof I and Gokhale, 1992; Hellerstein and Neumark, forthcoming)? In this
paper, in contrast to attempting to measure workers' productivity (orincrements thereto), we
test theoretical implications of the general human capital for wage profiles, tests that do not
require estimates or inferences regarding productivity.
We test two implications of the human capital model of general investment. At the
individual level, this model implies that there will be a negative relationship between the
initial wage level and wage growth of inexperienced workers. This implication has been
1A third, more recent explanation, is that workers prefer rising wage profiles, as a form of forced saving
(Frank and Hntr&nc. forthcoming; Loeweastein and Sicherman, 1991).
2lmplicatious of specific human capital investment are ambiguous. Becker (1975) argues that such investment
implies that wages grow dower than marginal product, but Carmichael (1983) and Blinder (1981) develop specific
human capital models in which wages grow faster than marginal product. Some implications of the forced-saving
model are Snilar to those of larears model, since workers arc —lessthan their marginal products when
young, and more when old.
Iconsidered in the literature (Hause, 1977 and 1980; Chamberlain, 1978; Lillard and Weiss,
1979; Kearl, 1988). The existing estimates, however, may be affected by a spurious
correlation stemming from regression to the mean, which leads to a bias towards a negative
relationship between wage levels and wage growth. In contrast, we attempt to test this
implication correcting for this negative bias. At the market level, the model implies that the
ratio of the present value of the wage profile of an investor to that of an otherwise identical
non-investor equals one? We also test this implication, which does not appear to have been
considered in the literature.4
To summarize the results, the evidence from the wage level-wage growth test points to
a negative relationship between initial wage levels and wage growth, even after correcting for
negative biases that may have influenced existing estimates of this relationship. The evidence
from the present value test suggests that the ratio of the present value of rising wage profiles
to flat wage profiles is quite close to one. Alternative estimates of this ratio arc tightly
clustered around one, and more often than not are insignificantly different from one.
Overall, then, the evidence is largely consistent with the general human capital modeL
II. Testing the Genera] Human Capita] Model
As Weiss (1986) emphasizes, the human capital model of general on-the-job
investment generates hypotheses at the individual and the market leveL At the individual
level, the model implies that there will be a negative correlation between the initial wage
level and wage growth of young workers, controlling for other factors that affect wages. This
arises because individuals face a tradeoff between lower current wages (entailing investment)
'Throughout, we abstract from endogenous labor supply variatiou, and &ncc refer to wage rather than —Felts
•A pailial exception is Hause (1977) who notes that equality of presentYAtesimplies lower variability across
mdivaduals of lifetime earnings than of annual earnings, and finds evidesec of this. Regression to the mean could —drivethis result as well.
2and higher future wages At the market level, the model has implications for the equilibrium
wage structure. In particular, 'at the start of working life the present value of the constant
earnings stream...must equal the present value of the observed earnings profile..." (Mincer,
1974, p. 18). In this paper, we test both of these implications of the hwnan capital model.
The first test has received the most attention in the literature. In our view, though, the
equilibrium implication regarding present values of wage profiles is at least as important, if
not more so, because it appears to specify a much sharper restriction on the data)
Testing for a Negative Relationship between Wage Lewis and Wage Changes
The first test is based on estimates of the relationship between levels and changes of
log wages (or residuals from the corresponding regressions). 'lids component of our research
parallels some earlier research, although much of this earlier research utilizes unusual data
sources. Hause (1977) provides estimates of partial correlations amoni earnings at different
ages using data from Sweden and the U.S. However, his data sources suffer from small
sample sizes and unsatisfactory earnings measures: the U.S. data are based on recalled full-
time earnings covering a fifteen-year period, while the Swedish data are based on total
taxable income. Reflecting these problems, perhaps, Hause's estimated signs of the partial
correlations vaiy widely, ranging from .75 to -.6, depending on the precise sample used and
the years or ages for which the correlations are computed. Using the Swedish data, Hause
(1980) embeds a similar test in estimation of the covariance structure of earnings, and finds a
5For example, nothing in the tartar or forced-saving models ndes out a negative correlatice between initial
wage levels and wage growth within a tingle job. And job sbop$og (see TopS and Ward 1992) may gestate a
negative correlation as indm4uals move through jobs, if those with the towed wages seek cut and move to
higher-Wage jobi. These altemative models do not make any prGr&wregardingpresent values of wage
er the life óycle, because they apply only to wage growth within a job. But heuristically, if all jobs
lasS. lifetime, the models would appar to have different implications. The tartar model implies that steeper
wage profiles entail higher wages, cit because costly bonding requires firms to pay a worker in excess of their
marginal product (Akertol and Katz, 1989) or beause the incentive caiftad boosts productivity (Lear and
Moore, 1984). The furred-saving model would have the opposite implication, since it asserts that workers
swifice sent value to obtain rising wage profiles
3significant negative correlation (-.49) between earnings and earnings growth. Kearl (1988)
studiesindividual-level data on all income(ratherthan earnings)from 19thcenturyUtah;
estimating a similar covariance structure, hefindsstrongnegative correlations (rangingfrom
-2to -.6). Lillard andWeiss(19'79) study scientistsin theU.S.,and fail tofinda negative
relationship between earnings levels and growth rates, which theysuggestmay be because
there are strong ability effects on both the level and growth of earnings for scientists.6
Chamberlain (1978), using the early years of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Men, finds strong evidence of a negative correlation (-.76) between the intercepts of wage
level andwagegrowth equations.
What we do differently is to consider the problem of negative bias induced by a
regression tothe mean type of problemin these micro-level estimates.7 To illustrate this
problem,suppose we have one observationon a level (defined for period t) and a change
(definedfromperiod t tot+1)of thelogwage for each individual. If there is any
measurementerror inwages,ormore generally if there are any influences on wages
unrelatedtohuman capital investment on the job which are not perfectly correlated over
time, then a spurious negative correlation is induced between the wage levelandthe wage
change. Denote by w,eitherthe log wage level, or the residual from the regression of log
'This paper was not directed towards testing the human capital inSet In fact, the authors find a negative
correlation (-.14) in rawwages,when they do not conditio, on variables such as experience. To the extent that
experience elf ecu reflect human capital investment, the raw arciatica may provide a better test.
'Lu addition, we use more complete data to estimate the wage equations. We use cijexo-level panel data, as
did Chamberlain, but construct measures of actual experience while he used only potential experience. AJso of
the papers cited, only Chamberlain used a proxy for unobserved ability, specifically an 10 score collected from
high schools. Unobserved ability is potentially important since hiajser-ability individuals may invest more (and
indeed appear to do so in Chamberlain's data), which imparts an upward bias to the correlation between wage
levels and wage growth (see also Hause, 1972). We use the National Longitudinal Survey Youth cohort (NLSY)
which has arguably superior proxies for ability.
4wages on controlvariablesthat may shift wages independently of human capital investment.'
The human capital model implies that w, is lower the larger the amount of current period
investment, denoted Ic, but w1 is higher the greater the amount of accumulated human
capital, denoted H,, at the beginning of the period. Assume that measured w1 is determined
by these two effects,plusan error term ç,
(1)
where B is the return on past investment, e is assumed forthemoment to be serially
uncorrelated, with mean zero in every period, and c, is uncorrelated with w1', which denotes
the unobserved component of the wage that is the return on human capital minus net
investment. (We also assume no depreciation.) We can use (1) to obtain an equation for the
change in log wages
(2) Aw1 = -lç + + B11,, - El-I, + €1.1 -
= -k11 + Ic,+Bk, + c,+ -
= Sw1'+ -
We also assume that human capital investment declines over time. In particular, we
assume that for all t, = 0k,, with 0 c 0 c 1. We can then rewrite equation (2) as
(3)
where(1-0 + a) > 0. Equations (1) and (3) reveal the essence of the human capital
model's prediction; investment in period t (Ic,) lowers period t wages but increases wage
growth from period t to t+1.
We are interested in the sign of the coefficient from a regression of Sw1 on w1. In
'Such variables might include scboo4ing, ability, union membership, marital status, etc. We look at results for
both raw wages and wage residuals. Weconstructthe residuals from rcgressicms of wage levels and changes on
the levels and changes, respectively' of these-.na4ard control variables However, wecxctudcexperience terms
from the regressions that create the residuals because, according to thehumancapital model, these reflect
investment elf ects.
5data on inexperienced workers, we can assume that the correlation between the terms
involving Ic in equations (1) and (3) swamps the correlation between k, in equation (3) and
131-I, in equation (1). because for such workers the return on cumulative past investments is
small. (More precisely, if workers are observed before the overtaking age, k, exceeds B1-I.)
Thus, as long as workers are observed before the overtaking age, the human capital model
predicts thatinthe regression (omitting the constant)
(4)
weshould find y c0.
The problem, however, is that as equations (1) and (2) make dear, both the
dependent and independent variables are measured with error. As in the usual case,
measurement error in w, biases the estimate of y toward zero. But unlike the usual case,
measurement error in the dependent variable also biases the estimate of y because this
measurement error is correlated with w1. To see this, note that the observed model
corresponding to equation (4)is
(5)
Inaddition to the usual measurementerrorbias associated with the term ?Ieenters
the equation a second time, because it affects the measurement of Awe. Thus, the plim of the
OLS estimate of y is
(6) y -(y+1)-Var(e)/Var(w)
so that the estimate is biased downward (rather than toward zero), as long as the absolute
value of y is less than one.9
'This itnothe precise approach taken in theexistingliterature. Ozamberlain (1978), Hause (1980). and
(er (1%8) estimate covariance structures for earnings (or for earnings orwage residuals) that remove
mdiv dual lbs effects and estimate theisnainingcorrelation between sndiwdualspeciflc intercepts and slopes.
In this set-vp, as well, uncorrelated meaaircaeut aror inwages introduces the same potential for a spurious
negative correJation. Ran ndividua wage is low in one period, relative to hisaverage then his wage must be
high in other periods, relative to his average, and hence his wage growth must be high.
6However1 we can obtain a consistent estimate of y by Instrumenting for w1 in equation
(5). In particular, we instrument with the lagged value w1.1. Given the assumption thatis
serially uncorreiated, w1.,is uncorrelatedwith both and anditis correlated with w,.
The variation in w1thatshould be explained by the Instrument is that related totheextentof
hwnan capital investment. The notion behind using WI_Iisthat a young person investing
relatively heavily in human capital will have low w1 as well as low wb,. However, if e is
serially correlated, then w1.1 is correlated with e,, and w1.1 is not a valid instrument.
Consequently, we also report results using w,. as an instrument instead of w1•1. For these
estimates, any bias from non-independent errors should be much smaller.2°
ComparingPresent Valuesof Rising and Flat Wage Pm files
Present value calculations rely on assumptions regarding the structure of the wage
profile fortworeasons. First. it is not enough to estimate a wage regression including the
standard controls as well as experience effects, and then to compute the present values of
earnings profiles first including the experience effects and then zeroing them out. Rather, we
need to be able to estimate the reduction in initial wages for investors implied by the human
'°Thconsider some specificexamples, ifis AJt(l) with a tocorrelation parameterp,then the — of the IV
estimateofyuSgw,.isy-p(y-p + 1)Var(€)/Cov(w,w.J. lip >O,y cO,andp + lvi 'C l,thebins
is negative, so a negative estimate of y could plausibly .dll reflect bias. However, 'if w,, is used as an instrument
instead of w,1, the bias should be much t,nslt't In this case the inconsistency in the IV estimate of v is
pkv' p + I)' Var(€)/Cov(ww4), which equals the bias when w is used as an instrument, multiplied by the
ratio pf(Cov(w,w4)/COv(W,w.,)}. This tatter ratio should be considerably less than one because p. which
measures the persistence in the unexplained component of the wage, should be less than
{Cov(w,w3)/Cov(w,w.j}, which measures the persistence in the overall wage. Ifs is MA(1), then w,,is
uncorrelated with s, and is a valid instrument. Therefore, if the two IV estimates using w and w,,1 arc very
close, there cannot be much bias from e following either an MA(l) or AR(l) process.
Because s is interpreted as influences on the wage other than investment. it might be presumed to be
positively serially correlated. Note, however, that variables associated with permanent differencesin wage levels
(which may cover most of the variables included hi dtnlhrd wage regressions) drop out of ç, c.and hence
may generate little bias. Rather, it is the transitoty, non-human capital influences on wagesthat are ci central
interest, and these may be largely uncotrelated over time. To garner some evidence on the non-independenceof
c, we estimated p from the residuals of wage regressions nrlndhtg individual fixedeffects, and expenenoc terms.
Whereas the estimate of p from the 1ni4n.k of the regression excluding fixed effects was .48, the estimate using
the fixed-effects regression was -.06. While suggesting that s is serially independent, this is not definitive because
c is meant to be the residual net of all human capital investment, some of which may beunobserved and
unrelated to the observables.
7capital model. Second, the estimated parameters of the log wage equation may provide
information on the appropriate discount rate to use in the present value calculations. Thus,
in contrast with thewagelevel-wage growth test, the escnt value test must be more closely
integratedwithstructural models of human capital investment.
The most familiar form of the human capital model'simplicationthat in equilibrium
the present values of alternative wage profiles for an individual are equal is embodied in
Mincer's (1974) model in which individuals invest in schooling only. This model is useful for
clarifying some issues that arise in interpreting standard wage equations in the context of the
human capital model. Given the assumption that individuals work for the same number of
years after completing schooling, and imposing the equality of present values of the earnings
streams resulting from alternative schooling choices, the wage equation
(7) w1=w0+r1S+ç
results, where w0 is the log wage of the individual with no schooling, S is years of schooling,
and r, is the rate of return to schooling, interpreted roughly as an average rate of return
across individuals, if this framework describes the determination of wages, then (perhaps
controlling for ability differences that influence w0), the equilibrium implication can be tested
by comparing the present value of the wage profile at one level of schooling with that of the
wage profile at another level of schooling, using an appropriate discount rate
Rosen (1977) has pointed out some difficulties related to using equation (7) to test the
human capital model, If individuals have varying rates of return to schooling, then the
Mincer model implies corner solutions, depending on whether an individual's rate of return
to schooling is greater than or less than r. Rosen showed that corner solutions can be
"OFcourse,the wage profile wouldhave to be4atcd to begin at the ompleticu ct schooling, and to
ttmue for araeinumber of years.
8eliminated by introducing individual variationinability and in costs of financing education,
which leads to a determinate equilibrium of schooling-wage combinations. However, the
slope of the log wage-schooling relationship does not identify the return to schooling, since it
confounds the role of education in producing human capital with covariation between wages
and schooling stemming from variation in ability and access to finance.
However, Willis (1986) develops an alternative interpretation of Mincer's model in
which, as a special case, equation (7) describes a determinate equilibrium, and the coefficient
on S is the rate of return to schooling. Willis considers a model with heterogeneous, rather
than homogeneous human capitaL'2 He shows that in such a model, as long as there is
equality of opportunity (i.e., all individuals face the same interest rate r), and equality of
'relative ability' (i.e.. abilityhasa single factor that shifts productivity equally in all pursuits),.
then equation (7) can be derived as a market equilibrium, with r as thi return to schooling.
and the present value of lifetime earnings, discounted at the rate r, equated across the
alternative human capital investment decisions facing an individual? Thus, under Willis's
reinterpretation of equation (7), comparison of the present values of alternative wage profiles
is a more compelling test of the human capital model.
While these issues have been addressed with respect to schooling decisions, they also
pertain to on-the-job investments, which must be brought into the model for the purposesof
this paper. The optimal path of post-schooling human capital accumulation depends on the
technology for producing human capitaL Mincer's approach was to assume that the solution
°Hetcrogeneons human capital implies that workers embodying different human capital investments arc only
imperfect substitutes in production. rather than rejr.nting different cffidency units' of asingletype of labor.
'3lte restriction regarding equal relative thility can be reined so that it holds for only some workers, while
for other workers ability is completely speri.HM to spedhic schooling levels (or occupations), as long as the
former type of workers an the marginal workers that determine equilibrium earnings dill eitndals (Willi5 p. 570).
9to the optimal investment problem is given by
(8) lç=k0-(k0/T)P,
where k is the ratio of time spent investing in period t, T is the period over which
investments are made, the 0subscript denotes the initialperiod, and P, is potential
experience in period t. In this case, denoting by rp the rate of return to post-schooling
investments, Mincer derived the log wage equation for period t as
(9) w, =r,S+ln{1-Ic0+(kJT)P}+r,c,P1+(-rk0/2T)P,2
The terms involving kG r,, and T reflect the accumulated returns to past investments, and the
negative impact on earnings of investment in period t (When w1 is observed).
There is, in fact, little a priorireasonto believe that equation (8) is the optimal
investment profile. We thus also consider an alternative specification of the investment
profile that was proposed by Mincer. In addition, we consider some specifications of the
wage equation augmented to account f or differences in labor force attachment. These
specifications are listed in Table 1, and are discussed in Appendix B.
According to Willis (1986), in a model with heterogeneous human capital, under the
same assumptions described above regarding equality of opportunity and ability, along with
the assumption that opportunities for post-schooling investment are independent of schooling,
the wage profiles that Mincer derived—incorporating returns to on-the-job investment—can be
derived as equilibrium wage profiles with the coefficient of schooling still measuring the
discount rate.'1 Arguably, r should also equal this discount rate because, in equilibrium,
individuals invest up to the point where the marginal gain from investment equals the
"This also requires that the optimal investment profllc be the same IØr each'types cJ human capital in the
hetercgeaeous human capital model. This an hold if It S schooling and not cm-the-job luv"—M that
dzfferagiag human capital. If it does not, though, then we can ouly estimate swncavenge expericoce-eanfings
reoide, and a structuraJ interpretation cI the parameters is less compelling.
10marginal cost (as, for example,inthe model in Ben-Porath, 1970).
Thus,in our empiricalwork we estimate wageequationssuch as equation (9),
substitutingr for r1andrp, and usingthe estimate of r as the discountratein the present
valuecalculations.0 Of course, Willis' reinterpretationof Mincer's model makes it clear
thatasking whether thepresent values ofobserved,estimated wage profiles areequalto the
present values of estimates ofwhatthesewageprofiles wouldbein the absenceof post.
schoolinginvestmentstests only a restrictedversionof the human capital model.
-
Nonetheless, it is an importantversionbecause, based on Willis'work, it must be the one that
researchers havein mind when they interpret the standard log wage equationas a human
capitalearnings function.
fflThe Data
We rely primarilyon datathrough1987from the NationalLongitudinalSurvey Youth
cohort(NLSY), whose respondents were aged 14-21 at its inception in 1979. This sample
offers some advantages for this research. For the test basedonthe wage level-wage growth
correlation, wewantasample witha large number ofobservationsbeforethe overtaldng age.
Also, asdiscussedearlier, unobservedabilitymaybepositively associatedwith boththe
intercept andtheslope ofthewageequation, hence bbiingtheresults against findinga
tradeoff between wagelevels andwagegrowthofyoung workers.TheNLSYhas test scores
fromthe Armed Services VocationalAptitudeBattery Test which canbe incorporated into
the model tocontrolfor this possiblesourceofbias. Research with these data suggests that
theyarenot contaminated withmeasurement errorwith respectto estimatingtheireffectson
UAmore subtle problem with leaving r, and r, uuconwained, and treating them as avenge ratesof return but
not estimates of the discount rate, is that we then have a multiplicity of possible discount rates.But
parameters of the optimal investment profile (such as equation(8))depend in part on this discount rate. Thus at
would be to vary the discount rate while .cnnntag that these parameters remain the same.
11wages (Blackburn and Neumark, 1993)."
We restrict the analysis to mento reduceproblemsfrom selection intoemployment,
and because we focus on the implications of the human capital model for continuous
workers.17 We impose some standard sample restrictions forestimatingwage equations, and
focus solely on white men. In addition, we impose some non-standard restrictions to obtain a
sample of individuals who are "typical" in terms of the human capital model-going to school
continuously and then working more or less continuously. These restrictions lead to a final
sample of 7,480 observations on 1,437 individuals. Details regarding the sample restrictions
and their effects on the potential sample size are given in Appendix A. Finally, in many of
the analyses we restrict the sample further, because we require data to define changes in
variables, or lagged values of variables. The effects of these restrictions on the sample are
also explained in Appendix A.
To explore the robustness of some of our results, we also use the Januazy 1987 CI'S
Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure supplement, imposing sample restrictions similar to
those used for the NLSY data. With this data set we can obtain a random sample of the
same age group included in the NLSY as of 1987 (ages 22-29), as well as a random sample of
workers of all ages. This data set includes information on the amount of time that
respondents have been engaged in their current kind of work, a variable that provides some
basis for comparison with results from the NLSY using actual experience. With both data
"Adisadvantageof the NL.SY is that the sample period covered is one of 'harp changes in the wage structure,
in panicular in the nti.n.iM returns to schooling and experience (see, e,g, MurphyandWelch 1991). The
increased return to experience over this period may make it difficult toy changes in returns to experience
for individuals as they gain experience (is., the structure of the wage profile). Thus,itwould be worthwhile to
reexamine evidence on these teals using data from a period with a more stable wage structure, We did, however,
verily that our results were unchanged if we dropped data Iran 1979-1%2, when, for thyc data, the returns to
schooling rose most rapidly (Blackburn and t4cumark, 1993).
"For the implicatkms of the human capital model for discontinuous workers, see Folackek (1975).
12sets, of course, results using potential experience can be compared.
Table 2 reports descriptivestatisticsand01_S estimatesof regressions for the level
and changeinlog wages, for the NLSY sample. Most of the estimates of the level equations
correspond to estimates from other samples. One exception is that the peak experience
effect occurs at 9.4 years. which is low compared to estimates from samples covering a
broaderage range.'8 The wage changeswith experience are positive forabout the first13
yearsofexperience, and thenbeginto decline, roughly paralleling theresultsfor levels.
IV.Ernoitical Results
Evidenceon she Wage Level-WageGrowth Tradeoff
Table 3 presents estimates of the regressions of log wage changes on log wage levels,
for both raw data and residuals. Looking first at the raw data, column (1) of Panel A
suggests a strong negative relationship between wage levels and changes, with an estimated
coefficient of -.259! However, as explained above, this negative relationship may be partly
spurious. This is confirmed by the estimates in column (2), in which the lagged wage is used
as an instrument for the contemporaneous wage. The estimated coefficient (-.058) is still
significant and negative, but is considerably closer to zero. The same result holds in column
'AppendixTable A2 provides estimates of comparable specifications for the 1987 observations from the
NLSY. and the January 1987 CPS supplement. For the latter data set, time doing the current kind of work is
used as a proxy for actual experience. For the 1987 NLSY data, the — of the profile is at 12.9 years of
experience, close to that in Table 1. For the CPS data for the same age group, the — is 83 years, even lower.
In contrast, for all ages from the CPS data, the — is 25.7 years. Thus, the roag quadratic in the returns to
experience. and the low implied experience level at which wages peak, appears to be largely attributable to the
use of data on yowig workers. The table also reports comparisons for specifirtn using potential expenence.
In this case, there is evidence that the experience level at which wages — is lower in the NISY (11.0 vs. 26.1
years in the CI'S for 22-29 ycar-elds). But the quadratic coefficient is imprecisely estimatedfor young workers in
both samplet
"The regression estimate of y was not corrected for observations that are not contiguous, which may bias this
estimate towards zero. But when we reestiniated y using only the contiguous observations, the results were
virtuaUy unchanged.
13(3), wherewe instrumentinstead with the wage lagged twice?1 Thesimilarityof the
estimatedcoefficientsin columns (2) and (3) suggests that serial correlation in the error term
does not bias the instrumental variable results.
The lower panel of the table reports the same set of results using residuals from
regressions of log wage levels and changes on the levels and changes, respectively, of the
control variables (other than experience) used in Table 2. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar.
The estimates in Table S make two points. Looking simply at wage levels in one
period, and wage changes from that period to the next period, results in negative bias in the
estimated relationship between wage levels and wage growth, suggesting that previous
estimates have overstated the wage level-wage growth tradeoff. On the other hand, estimates
that should reduce or eliminate this negative bias do not overturn the result that the
relationship is negative, as predicted by the general human capital model.
We can delve further into the implications of the general human capital model for
wage level-wage growth relationships like those reported in Table 3. According to the model,
this relationship should be most strongly negative for the least experiinced workers, rise to
zero at the overtaking age, and subsequently be positive. In Table 4, we explore these
implications by looking at the earliest and latest available observations on each individual,
imposing a maximum of three years of potential experience on the early observations, and a
minimum of six years of potential experience on the late observations. Given the similarity
nAn alternative to instrumenting wills w,1, for example, is simply to sit,szitutc w.1 for WrASequaL on (5)
shows,this removes most of the bias from regression to the mesa, because only the component of the error
a correlated with the regressor (in contrast toy+ 1)e when w, is used as a regressor). Thus, if yls relatively
small, there should be little bias front using w,,. In fact, the eaimah-ofy obtained front this method should be
biased towards zero, relative to the estimate using w,1asan IV for w,. For .11 of the specifications reported in
the per, this was the case. For example, for the estimates corresponding to Table 3, but using w,, or w,2 as
regremas, instead of instruments, the estimates of y ranged frau -.029 to -.041, with standard errors of .013 to
14of the resultsinTable 3 using w andw,4as instruments,inthis table we use only the
former(to obtain larger samples).
When the wage change is regressed on the contemporaneous wage, as reported in
Panel A, the estimated coefficient is strongly negative for both the early (-279) and late
(-r4)observations.The latter negative estimate, and the near equality of these estimated
coefficients, both contradictthegeneral human capital model. However, upon instrumenting
for w, with w,.1, only the estimated coefficient for the early observations is negative(-.099)
andsignificant, while that for the late observations is positive and insignificant. The results
in Panel B, using the residuals, are qualitatively similar. Thus, the regression to the mean
problem inherent in the estimates in columns (1) and (3) apparently obscures evidence in
favor of the general human capital model?
Evidence on Present Value Comparisons of Wage Profiles
Next, we use estimates of alternative wage profiles to compute the ratio of the present
value of the wage profile of an investor to that of a non-investor. The wage equation
estimates for the alternative specifications of the wage equation are reported in Table 5.
Thefirstfour columns report estimates of quadratic earnings functions, based on a linearly
declining investment profile. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates of the original Mincer
formulation,firstexcluding and then including the test scores. In both cases, the estimates of
the investment period ('F) appear rather low, at 4.4-43 years. The estimatesofk0 indicate
that initial wages are reduced by about 30-40 percentbyhuman capital investment?
Columns (5) and (6)Stead reportestimates of Mincer's Gompertz earnings functions, based
ra the fact that the estimated coelfldent in column (2)11mestroeØy negative than that in column (2)
of Table 31s withthe fact that In Table 4,theestimate is based wily witheleast experienced workers,
while In Table 4Itis based os .11 workers.
No4e that tile positive .dii"tnofk imply that there is a tradeoff bctween Initial wage levels and wage
growth, cnint with the results in Tables 3and4that.nmkiethistradeoff ins less restrictive manner.
15on an exponentially declining investment profile. These estimates suggest a longer
investment period. For example, B =.17implies that it takes17.6years for lc to decline to
five percent of its initial value.
Our principal concern is with the present value calculations, reported in the last three
rows of the table. We report estimates for three alternative levels of final potential
experience (30, 40, and 50 years). In columns (1) and (2), the ratios of the present value of
the wage profile of an investor to that of a non-investor are significantly greater than one,
although the estimated ratios are all quite close to one, ranging from 1.02 to 1.09. In
addition, while the standard errors (constructed from first-order approximations to the
nonlinear function of the parameters being tested) are quite small for these specifications,
there arc other sources of uncertainty that are not captured in the statistical formulas, such as
mortality, productivity growth in different jobs, etc.,sothat the precision of these estimates
should probablyberegarded as overstated? Similar calculations are reported in columns
(5)and(6) for the Gompertz earnings functions. For this specification, the estimated ratio of
the present value of the wage profile of an investor to that of a non-investor is very close to
one under any of the assumptions regarding years of work. The estimates range from 1.00 to
1.02, and are never significantly different from one.
For both earnings functions the estimate of k0 rises slightly upon including the test
scores, suggesting that omitted ability obscures part of the reduction in initial wages of
investors, because they have on average higher ability. Given this result, we attempt to go
2'Tbe precision of these estimates may seem surprising. However, only the parameters of the experience
profile (it, r, k and 1') arc required to esñmate the ratio at the present values of the earnings profiles. Let
ln(w,) -XBbe the profile of non4nvestots, and ln(w,) -XB+ Z,y be the profile of investors. Then ltttingr
denote the interest rate, and taking sums from t- 1 toT, this ratio is:
(I exp(XB+Z,y)/(1 +r)'}/{I cxp(XB)/(1 +r)— {exp(XB)1 exp(Z17)/(1 +r)t}/(exp(XB) .1 1/(t +r)')
(I exp(Z,y)/(1+r)'}/(Z 1/(1+r)')
16one step further than including the test scores, including instead individual fixed effects For
these estimates, second-order Taylor-series approximations to the nonlinear wage equations
are used,inorder to obtain models that are linear in the variables. However, because
schooling is fixed for each individual, the coefficient of schooling cannot be identified. Thus,
we assume that the specifications including the test scores adequately remove any omitted
ability bias in the schooling coefficient, and, in columns (3) and (7), impose the estimate of
the return to schooling from the previous column. As expected given more complete
controlling for unobservable ability, for both the quadratic and Gompertz earnings functions,
the estimates indicate higher initial investment (a larger estimate of k0), and a longer
investment period (a larger estimate of T in column (3), and a smaller estimate of B in
column (7)), although,admittedly, anestimate of k0 of S5 for the Gompertz earnings
function is implausible.Forthe quadratic earnings function, in column (3), the effect of
removing the fixed effects on the estimated present value ratio is rather small, although the
relative present value of the wage profile of investors rises slightly. For the Gompertz
earnings function, the effect is somewhat more severe. In particular, for an assumed work
life of 30 years, the ratio of present values is significantly below one.tm
As a final exercise with the NLSY data, we turn to estimates of the specifications
incorporating data on actual experienee using the specifications described in Table 1 and
Appendix B? For the quadratic earnings function, the estimates indicate an investment
tmlte differences relative to columns (2) and (6) stem principallyfrom the fixed-eli eels estimation, not the use
of second-order linear approximations. When we reestimated the specification in column (2) using the second-
order approximation, the estimates of r, k and I were similar to those in °'n(2),and the estimated ratios at
present values were identicaL When we reestimatcd the specification in column (6) using the second-other
approximation, the .crirn.t-ofk rose to 36 while the estimate of 8 fell to .07. The estimated ratios atpresent
values were .96, 1.00, and 1.02, for an assumed work life of 30, 40, and 50 years, respectively.
2tFor these specifications we revert to including the lest scores, and excluding the flied effects. The estimates
with fixed effects were quite imprecise, and the estimates of k,, exceeded one for both earnings functions. The
problem is likely that A, the ratio at actual to potential experience, varies little for individuals (it varies somewhat
'7period of 13.02years.which may be more plausible than the estimate of 4.43 years from the
parallel specification using only potential experience. The estimates for the Gompertz
specification are little changed relative to the estimates in column (6). For both earnings
functions, the estimated ratios of present values of the wage profiles are close to one, and
not significantly different from one, whatever the assumed years of work.
Finally, we explored the robustness of the results for the original quadratic and
Gompertz earnings functions, using our 1987 CPS data set. These estimates are reported in
Table 6, for 22-29 year-olds (the age range of the NLSY sample in 1987), and for workers of
all ages. The estimates are quite similar in either case, although for the 22-29 year-olds, the
estimate of T is quite imprecise. Most importantly, for both age ranges and both earnings
functions, we again obtain estimated ratios of present values of wage profiles that are close
to one, ranging from .99 to 1.04, most of which are not significantly different from one.
We interpret the evidence from the present value comparisons as providing striking
consistency with the prediction of the general human capital model that, in equilibrium, the
present value of the wage profile an individual faces if he invests in human capital equals the
present value of the wage profile if he does not invest. For a number of specifications,
samples, and estimators our estimates of these ratios are tightly clustered around one,
although sometimes the estimates are significantly different from one. However, an estimate
of 1.02, even with a standard error less than .01,doesnot strike us as providing any
substantive rejection of the general human capital model.
V. Conclusions
The human capital model of general investment implies that, at the individual level,
inexperienced workers give up present wages in return for wage growth. At the level of the
because itisupdated each year).
18market, equilibrium implies that the ratio of the present value of the wage profile of an
investor to that of an otherwise identical non-investor equals one. In this paper we test both
of these implications. In general, we view the evidence as consistent with the general human
capital model.
The evidenceon the wage level-wage growth tradeoff points to a negative relationship
betweeninitialwagelevelsand wagegrowth.However, failure toaccountfor theproblem
ofregression to themeanleads to severe negative bias in estimates of this relationship, and,
more importantly, resultsina negative estimate even for workers who are likelyatorbeyond
theovertakingage.Incontrast, aftercorrectingforregressionto the mean, theestimated
relationship ispositive for more experienced workers, and negative onlyforinexperienced
workers, as predicted bythegeneral human capital model.
The evidence from the present value estimates is that the ratio of the present value of
the wage profile of an investor to that of an otherwise identical non-investor is generally near
one, depending on the exact earnings function specification, sample, and estimator. While the
estimates are sometimes significantly different from one, they are tightly clustered around
one, and rarely differ by more than .05. Thus, in our view, the present value tests also
corroborate the predictions of the human capital model.
We hasten to emphasize that, to the best of our knowledge, our tests of the human
capital model are new. While other researchers have estimated wage level-wage growth
correlations, none have addressed the regression to the mean problem. And we have come
across no papers that implement the present value tests. Thus, we expect further refinements
and replications of these and related tests to yield more definitive answers.
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A munber of restrictions are imposed on the NLSY sample in order to focus on men
who followthe "typical"pattern of school, work, and investment in the original human capital
models. First, we ensure that they are enrolled in school relatively continuously from age six.
Inparticular,the sample is restricted to individuals whose age at departure from school (i.e.,
the last time they are observed inschoolinthe sample) waswithin two years of what this age
would have been had the individual begun grade 1 at age 6, remained continuously enrolled
in school, and completed one grade each year; only post-schooling observations are used.
Second, we focus on individuals who work relatively continuously. Specifically, measuring
potential experience from the actual date of departure from schooling, we restrict the sample
to individuals whose actual experience (based on cumulative weeks worked since leaving
school) is more than one-half of their potential experience. We also impose some relatively
standard restrictions on the sample, including omitting individuals who spent any time in the
military, and observations for which respondents report a wage less than one-half of the
minimum wage, report their industry as agriculture, forestry, or fisheries, or in which they
report they are self-employed. We also require a minimum of two observations per person,
for some of the analysis. Finally, some of the analyses require multiple observations per
person, or entail other restrictions, hence leading to smaller sample sizes. Theeffects of the
sample selection rules and the data requirements on the sample size and number of
individuals available are documented in Appendix Table Al.Appendix B: Alternative Investment Ptofiles and Wage Equations
An alternative investment profilethat wasoriginally considered byMincer,buthas
been little used in the subsequent literature, is one in which the investment ratio k, declines
exponentially, or
(Bi) Ic, = k3exp(-BP,)
This leads to the wage equation
(32) w, = rlcaJ8 -(r,,kjB)exp(-BP,)+ln(l-k0exp(-BP1))
We also consider specifications that bring data on actual experience into the
estimation. We follow Mincer (1978) in assuming that full-time earnings capacity inperiod
(F,) is given by
(B3) E,=E,.1(l+rAl)
wherek, isgiven byequation(7). As Mincer (1978) points out, this specification captures the
notionthat "opportunities and incentives for market-oriented (job)investmentsshould
increasewith theamountof time devotedto thelabor market" (Mincer 1978, p. 3), by
entailingapositive relationshipbetween dollarinvestment costsand hours of work.A
representsthe fractionof potentialexperiencean individual actually works,assumed constant
andestimatedbytheratioof actualexperience to potential experience at apointin time.
This investment profile yields the wage equation
(84) w, = (r1,k0).AP-(r1,lcJ2T).(AP?) +In{1-k+(k0/T)'P,}•'
LettingIc, = k0exp(-BAP,), the exponentially-dedlisting investment ratio can also be
'This alternative wage equation was proposed by MIncer (1978) in response to an alternative equation
roPosed by Hanushek and Quigley (1978).mcneb.nge arose because in the linear approzisna Lions to
equations (9)and(B2) used in the literature, ç and r, are not separately identified along with either k, and T, or
k, and B, whereas bringing actual experience into the wage equation (as in equations (B4) and (BS) permits all of
the parameters to be separately identified. For reasons n$AIII.4 in the text, we do not exploit these augmented
specifications (a this purpose, but rather only as a coherent means & incorporating dais on actual experience.
We did, however, explore the consequences ci letting ç andr be unequal. As a general matter, this led
torathernonsensical estimates, with r in the range of .4-3.Suchresults have tobeviewed as casting doubt
either on these specifications, on the human capital model generally, or on the specific implication thatr, should
equal rr because in equilibrium both cl these are driven to equal the discount rate.used in the context of this extension of the model, yielding the wage equation
(B5) =Ark0/B-(Ar9k/B)exp(-BP,) +ln{I-k0exp(-BP,)}
'This can be derived bysubsiitutingequation (B!)intoequatkm (B3), repeated substituling for lagged E,
substituting the integral from 0totforthe susnmatioaz, and integrating.Table 1
AlLenative WageEquationPuame*czizations
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DesczipdveStatisticsandWageLevel and WageChange Regressions, ?4LSYWhite Male Non-Military Sample.
012Estimates, 1979-1987.
DependentVariable for Regressions Logarithm or Change in Logarithm of Hourly Wage'
Means Level Change




3.78 .13 AExperience .22
(2.17) (.01) (.02)
Experience1 x 10' 18.98 -.71 A Experience' X 10' .20
(20.07) (.09) (.10)
Married, spoleFestal .35 .07 A Married, spowe pctscnt -.02
(.48) (.01) (.02)
Divested, widowed,or .04 .00 ADivorced,widowed, or -.06
separated (20) (.02) separated (.03)
Union memba .21 .23 AUnionmember ii
(.41) (.01) (.01)
SMSA 31 .12 A SMSA .03
(.46) (.01) (.02)
South .30 .02 ASooth -
(.46) (.01) (.03)
Acaic te 29 -.04 —
(.72) (.01)





1. The conatnicted sample has 7,480 aoss-seciiooal thzervafian on 1,437 individuals. In this table, the last observation on
each individual has to be dropped, to detme she change, reSting in &043 observations on each individuaL Standard errors
ci csr,denl estimates (not corrected lot dependence among observaSis on the seme individual) are reported in
pereallien The changes in column (3) are defined from period t(the period ci the level) to the ness available cbservatioo
____ i e,tin.eea variables welt computed as the actual change divided by the number 01 years elapsedbetween
observations. The experience measure is acewSaS weeks wetted time leaving school, divided by 52. Years of schooling
and kg sen art constant in the sample, and therefore drop out of the change speduicadass. All specifications include
dummy variables fo, the year from which the observation was thaw. Coeflicients for these dummies, and the intercept, are
aol reported. The teat scores war pco.processetr by regressing them on age dummies for all observations (on white males)
for whom teat scores were available. The residuals from these regressions were then used. The 'academic teat' is the
.vmge ci the residuals for the teats of arithmetics, mathematics, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and general
rdenee. The technical test' is the average of the residuals for the test ci milo and shop knowledge., electronics, and
L... —I kaow'ntge.Table 3
Regrcssioos of Cbaogea in Log Wages on Lcvcls of Log Wages, NLSY Sampl&
A. Rcpcuioos Using (lange. and Levels of Log Wages,
Dependent Vszhblc (lange in Log Wages from I to 1+1
(1) (2) (3)
Log wage at I -.259 -.058 -.049
(.012) (.018) (.021)
1' .125
tnsuumcat for log wage None Log wag., Leg w.gc.
B. Regressions Using for(lange. and Lcvcls of Leg Wages,
Dependent VariabIc Residual (lange is Log Wages irom I to til'
Log wage residual at t -.318 -.065 -.062
(.013)() (.027)
1' .153
Instrument for Jog wage None Log wagç1 ¼
1.The ample 1. rcdñdcd to individuals with four a more obwvatioas, to define the
changes and the lags That axe 5455 thwvaxions on 1,037 individuals satisfying this
rcstñczioo. The correlations ate based on .11 but the flat two observationsforeach of
theseindividuals, a 3,381 observations.Theregressions inPanelA also include dummy
vaziablcsfortheyear fromwhichtheobservation was dawn.
2.Theregressionsfrom whichther'4an computedsac thesame as in Table2,
captthat the experience variables sacexcluded, andateestimated using all(5.455)
observations on 141 viduniswith four amoreobsenajions.Table 4
Regressions of Changes is Log Wages on Lank of Log
Eazlieat and Latest Available Obseivations, NLSY Sample
A. Rcgressicas Using Changes and Levels of Log Wages,
DCpCSCaI Vazisblc t'Sngn is Log Wages hoes IIDItS
EarlieMObservation aEachPawn, Latest Obacivados on Each Person,
Potential Expeiicoce s3 Potential Experience i 6
(N-Mi. Mea,, Pnienlial flneyienee-t19) Mean PSei,tisl Exnaienet..23l
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log wage at t .219 -.099 374 .008
(.028) (.046) (.028) (.045)
123
Insoument br log wage None Log wage,, None Log wage,.1
5. Regressions Using Rasidoals for Changes and Levels of Log Wages,
Dependent Vaziablc Real flngs S Log Wages from Ito 1+1'
Log wage residual at t -.353 -.150 -.329 .031
(.030) (.055) (.030) (.056)
.175 .152
Inslnsnent for kg wage None Log wage,., Noes Log wage,.,
1.Thesample is restricted to individuals with three or moan thsezva&ma to define the changes and the lags. The
regressions from which the residuals are computed are the tames in Table 2, ezonpt that the experience variables are
excluded, and are estimated using .1! (5,831) thservatioos on the 1,225 individuals with three or more observations.Table 5
Non-L2ncar Least Squares Fnin..tn a( StnacturaJ Panmcten of General Human Capital lavcs*nient Profdcs,
and RaUa at Present Values of Wage Profiles of Invegors Relative to Non-lnveaora NLSY Sample'
Ousdratle Farninn Functiens flonnert, Eaminr Funrflts
I I I 111 U II U IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parameter es:D1w1e5
.09 .08 .08 .08 .09 .08 08 .08 ()( (.003)(.003) (003) (.003)
.29 30 .65 .43 .43 45 .95 .48
(.02) (.02) (.27) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.29) (01)
T 4.48 4.43 927 13.02
(.66) (49) (3.53) (3.18)
B .. — — .17 .16 .05 .12
(22) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Tegscorc,includc4 No Yes No Yea No Yes No Yes
Individual effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
included
32 .33- 34 32 33 .34
P1W ratios.
iiii.'esiors/non4nwsf ott
Max. potentialexpcr.-30 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.02 1.01 1.00 .84 .96
(.01) (.01) (.004) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.06) (.03)
Max.potential expcr.-40 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.01 .95 .98
(.003) (.004) (.02) (LIZ) (.02) (.02) (.17) (.03)
Max. potential exper.e50 1.02 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 .98
(.002) (.002) (02) (.01) (.02) (.04) (33) (.03)
1. There are 7480 obaervisiims. Asymptotic andard earn at entWf cadmatsa and spproelmaie atandard anon at
PDV ratios axe reported in parentheses. The aadazd errac at the PDV ratios ware m4"4 using a flritorda hear
approxirnatios of the kactiom used in the nler.I.&... and computing Its standard error using the variaaoe.covarisace matrix
of the eoetfielent '•n Dummy variables for marital stabis, union membcrship SMSA, South, and for the year from
which thsavaxicms west draws wart inrln.t.A The PDV ratios is ,.Jns. (4) and (8) arc estimated using the ample mean
oH. - .84. Roman numerals I-IV refer to the srwntin.t listed in Table 1. For the fixed-effects ni4.nin in es.b.e.sc (3)
and (7). seccmd-order Taylor series approx maticss to the earnings function uve used to thtais models that ware hear in
the variables. In these -alrn'"n the estimate of r from the peceding column was Imposed, thaw the sample was eouistnicted
so that achooliag ii fixed for each individuaLTable 6
Non-LinwLeast Squares Estimates of Struetwal Parameters of General Human Capital
Investment Profiles, and Ralios of Present Vain ci Wage Profiles of Investors Relative to Non-Investors,
wwte Male —iwa's sample'
oMdrkEsrniiws P,metin,n(1 flcnnx Eanjxn P,mrtinns (lfl
Allages 22-29 Allages 22-29
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pwwnrteggi,natw
r .08 .10 .08 .10
(.002) (.01) (.002) (.01)
.27 .40 .40 .43







Max. potential exper.-30LW 1fl 1.00 .99
(.001) (.03) (.01) (.18)
Max.potential apcr.-40 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.02
(.001) (.01) (.01) (.23)
Max.potential apex—SO 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.03
(.001) (.01) '°°. (.19)
L These art 6.221 observations lot the as all ages nay..and1,405 thaeivasions lot the sample aged 12-29. Asymptotie
sandard moss of cocWudent —5'-anandapproximate standard egress of PDV ration arc reported In parentheses. The
standard moss of the P1W ratios wore -4—-'-4 by usIng a first-order bear approximation of the function used In the
nL-nlnitflandcompeting Its standard amos utg the ,ariaece-covariaacs malt of the .a.Ilfr&-. nthnnDummy
vañables for mantel status, union membcrship 5MM, sad South were Induded. Roman aumerals I and II refer to the
listedin Table 1.T.bIcAl
Sample Caiwuction aiid Ssmpks AvailibicforEach Aaalyà NLSY DataSd
lNlinduAls
Samplecnnclniclinn (si,cccszivetrictir.'I
FuflNLSY samplc.1979-1987 114174 12686
Males 57627 6403
Wbita (oat-bLack, cs-bhpaoic) 34110 3190
Non-military sample 28521 3169
ladividualswith nomilitaryservice 22134 3126
Ioscrvicws 26601 3126
Employed suncy weekwithrcportcd wIge 17165 3016
Wage >mit-bailo( 'ikm"iwage 16837 2998
Not stiff -cmploycd 13929 2970
Not in agñcukurc forcstsy 15365 21
wfs&bcrics
Noa-cnroOcd 11634 2725
Pog4chooI jag 10666 2533
Caiinaais(and noomssiag) .cbooing vu 1881
r1constnwS sample,nim-missiag &Iz, 7480 1431
adalcxpcñcocc ￿ oac-bali of potcmiilczpc4cacc
i4annimot two thianbcns papen
Tabk 1 wage Icvei and wage growth 6043 1437
rcgrcsdoos(rcquiics dropping lad cbsavatioo
on cart penon)
Tahlc2 .egrcssios of w.ge growth 3381 1037
wagt kvd (wages iad raidualsX inwumcnling with
wage Iaggcd oocc md wage lagged twice (rcqthrcs
minimum of four obwntiocs tr pcnoi, and dropping
Lint two obscnacioas on each pcnca)
Wagekvd tad wage growth rcçessioas 5453 1037
to Sale scsi4isals
Table 3: ngrcsdoas of wage growth al 663 663
wage lcvcl, earliest obwvSoc with polatial
cxpcncaa 3 ia&nimadag with wlgc lagged cace
Tabkiivgnssiau ci wagc growth cc 628 688
wageIcvd, latest thscsnficuz with pc&aliil
apcñcacc ￿ 6, thssruwcsSg with wa taggcd cc
Wige leyd and wage powdi revcuicns 5831 1223
o .aimal. rcL4i.ah
Tpbk 4t foil sgm$ minimum ol two thsavalioms
per person 7480 1437Appeadix Table .42
WageLevel sad Wage Oaage Regressions.
White Males, Jasuazy 1%? CI'S sad NLSY 1%? Samples.
Dependent Vaziablt Lcgarithm w Qisage in Logarithm at Hourly Wage'
NLS'Y 1087 ('PS 1087. 23-29 ('PS 1081 All Aaes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yearsottcbooiing .09 .09 26 .10 .07 .08
(.01) (.01) (.005) (.01) (.002) (.002)
Experience .11 .09 .04
(.03) (.01) ()
Experience'x 10' 42 31 01
(.18) (.10) (205)
Potential .07 — .07 .04
experience (.02) (21) (.002)
Potential -21 -14 -.06
apericnc& x i(' (.15) (.08) (.03)
Married, spouse present .10 .12 .12 28 .29 .19
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Divaced, widowed, or -.01 .01 11 .08 .24 .13
sqwaled (.04) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.02) (112)
Union member .17 .17 .22 .21 .15 .11
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01)
SMSA .13 .1.3 .14 .14 .15 .15
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
South .21 -21 -23 -D4 -.04 -24
(.03) (23) (.02) (22) (.01) (.01)
it' .23 .19 32 .41 .40
Peak at experience 12.9 17.0 83 26.1 253 30.6
profile (years)'
1. There are 1,405 observations for the CI'S ample at 23-29 year a6,221obsavadons fir the CI'S all ages ample. and
1,213 observations for the N1.SY sample. Standath anon of rn-flw&.t.nmafr sicreported in parentheses. The intercept
is not reported. The ample ,esuicticns and variable definitions applied to the N1.SY sample a's Ike lame as those in Table ' U'sample,the Occupational Mobility and Job Taunt Supplemast bass quentirm as the length of time doing the
canaL hind of woek this is used nan nun', of actual apaia.ce for this ample.
2. For .11 yew of the NLSY data (7480 observafices) the peaks for 's"m.n (1) and (2) an 10.8 and 114 yen